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Ex Post Sampling Risks and Decision Rule
Choice in Substantive Testing
Abstract
In the present paper, we provide guidance to the auditor in
selecting a statistical decision rule ex post to sampling. While the
professional literature has recognized that the two most widely used
decision rules provide equivalent ex inte sampling risks, empirical re-
search has shown that substantial risK. differences can arise ex post
to sampling when underlying statistical assumptions are violated. We
explain how such violations can cause risk differences and provide sug-
gestions for pairing decision rules with statistical estimators based
upon an ex post analysis of the sample evidence (e.g., error pattern).

The audit inference process involves the formulation and testing
of propositions (hypotheses) about the auditee's internal controls and
account balances. Statistical decision rules provide a means of deter-
mining whether audit sample evidence confirms or refutes such proposi-
tions. Two decision rules are employed widely when performing sta-
tistical tests of account balances. The Elliott and Rogers (E&R)
[1972] decision rule specifies the conditions under which sample evi-
dence supports the proposition that the account book, value is fairly
presented. Statement on Auditing Procedure (SAP) 54 [AICPA, 1972] pre-
sents an alternative decision rule based upon the proposition that the
account book value is not fairly presented.
Implementation of either the E&R or SAP 54 decision rule, in
classical variables sampling, requires the auditor to specify a prelim-
inary estimate of the standard error of the mean and then determine the
appropriate sample size so that the sampling risks of incorrect accep-
tance and rejection of the account book value (see Statement on
Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 39) are less than allowable levels. Since
the E&R and SAP 54 decision rules require the same sample size to pro-
vide equivalent ( ex ante ) sampling risks (see Roberts [1974]) and are
based upon the same sample statistics (i.e., mean and standard error
estimates), either decision rule can be employed to evaluate the fair-
ness of the reported account book value ex post to sampling.
The professional auditing literature provides considerable guidance
for the auditor's ex post (to sampling) decisions such as increasing
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the sample size, selecting a fall-back estimator, and employing alter-
native audit procedures. However, guidance in deciding which decision
rule to employ ex post to sampling has not been presented. Discussions
in the professional literature have focused upon the decision to modify
the E&R decision rule when the sample estimate of the standard error is
larger than the preliminary estimate. Modification makes the E&R deci-
sion rule formally equivalent to the SAP 54 decision rule (see Roberts
[1978
,
p. 251]) and, in concept, allows the predetermined risk of
incorrect acceptance to be maintained. However, when there are esti-
mation problems, the actual risk of accepting a misstated account book
value actually could be higher under the Modified E&R (or SAP 54) deci-
sion rule than under the E&R decision rule.
In the present paper, we provide guidance to the auditor in
selecting (modifying) a decision rule ex post to sampling when tradi-
tional variables estimators are employed and underlying statistical
2
assumptions are violated. Recent empirical research indicates that
such violations cause estimation problems and that their consequences
are decision rule specific. Since the nature and severity of estima-
tion problems depend both upon the characteristics of the accounting
population and the particular estimator employed, postponing decision
rule choice until after the sample evidence has been collected is
advantageous and permits the auditor to pair decision rules with
3
estimators.
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows:
In the second section, we discuss sampling risks from an ex ante
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perspective and identify the relationship between inferential errors
and audit outcomes under the E&R and SAP 54 decision rules. The third
section presents a discussion of audit risk consequences ex post to
sampling. Specifically, we explain how violations of underlying
statistical assumptions can expose the auditor to different ex post
risk consequences under the E&R and SAP 54 decision rules and identify
the implications of recent empirical research bearing on their selec-
tion or modification when auditing asset accounts. Policy implications
and concluding remarks are presented in the fourth section.
EX ANTE SAMPLING RISKS
When applying either the E&R or SAP 54 decision rule, the auditor
explicitly or implicitly tests hypotheses about the auditee's account
book value (see Roberts [1974]). Two types of inferential errors can
arise when performing such tests. A Type I error, by statistical con-
vention, results when a true null hypothesis is incorrectly rejected
and the associated risk of this error is alpha (see Mood, Graybill, and
Boes [1974]). Alternatively, a Type II error results when a false null
hypothesis is not rejected and the associated risk is beta. Since the
null hypotheses under the E&R and SAP 54 decision rules are different
(see discussion below), the audit consequences of each type of inferen-
tial error also are different. In this section, we identify the rela-
tionship between inferential errors and audit outcomes under each
decision rule.
The following null and alternative hypotheses have been associated
with the E&R decision rule:
H : the account book value is correct (i.e., the monetary
error, E = 0).
H : the account book value is misstated (i.e., E > TE , where
TE denotes tolerable error, see SAS 39 [AICPA, 1981] ). 4
A Type I error, given the above hypothesis formulation, would likely
result in the auditor's performing unnecessary tests before learning
that the account book value actually is fairly presented. Alternatively,
a Type II error could result in the financial statements being materially
misstated (see E&R [1972]).
The alternative SAP 54 decision rule can be formulated as the fol-
lowing hypothesis test (see Roberts [1974, p. 52]):
H : the actual monetary error (E) is greater than TE
.
H : the actual monetary error (E) is zero,
a
Given the reversal of the auditor's null and alternative hypotheses
under the SAP 54 decision rule, a Type I error could result in materially
misstated financial statements, while a Type II error could result in
the performance of unnecessary tests. Note that these audit consequences
are the opposite of those under the E&R decision rule.
The difference between the audit consequences of Type I and Type II
inferential errors under the SAP 54 and E&R decision rules was discussed
by Roberts [1974], but is not widely understood. More recently, SAS 39
addressed the inconsistent relationship between inferential errors and
audit outcomes by introducing a new terminology which accommodates both
decision rules. Specifically, as discussed above, SAS 39 refers to the
risk of incorrect acceptance of the account book value and the risk of
incorrect rejection of the account book value. The former risk is
related to the effectiveness of the audit, while the latter relates to
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audit efficiency. Hereafter, we avoid confusion with the hypothesis
formulation by referring to the risk of incorrect acceptance as an ef-
fectiveness error and the risk of incorrect rejection as an efficiency
error. An audit effectiveness error, therefore, refers either to a
Type II error under the E&R decision rule or a Type I error under the
SAP 54 decision rule. Similarly, an audit efficiency error refers to a
Type I error under the E&R decision rule or a Type II error when the
SAP 54 decision rule is employed.
While the relationship between audit consequences and inferential
risks is different under the E&R and SAP 54 decision rules, Roberts
[1974] has shown that the decision rules require the same sample size
to maintain equivalent ex ante risks of effectiveness and efficiency
errors. However, when there are estimation problems due to violations
of underlying statistical assumptions, the ex post risk exposure can
differ under the E&R and SAP 54 decision rules.
EX POST SAMPLING RISKS
In this section, we explain the nature and sources of differences
in ex post sampling risks under the E&R and SAP 54 decision rules as a
basis for guiding the auditor's selection of a decision rule ex post to
sampling. Our analysis is facilitated by formulating each decision
rule as a confidence interval. Under the E&R decision rule, the audi-
tor would conclude that the auditee's account book value (X) is fairly
stated if and only if
Y - z .. • s//n < X < Y + z ,„ • s//n, (1)
a/2 a/2
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where:
Y = sample estimate of the population account value
s//n = sample estimate of the standard error for Y
z , 9
= standard normal deviate associated with a two-tailed a
risk of incorrect rejection of H .J
o
Following the SAP 54 decision rule, ex post to sampling, the auditor
would conclude that the auditee's account book value is not fairly pre-
sented unless the computed upper precision limit for error:
|E| + z
a/2
• s//n" < TE, (2)
where:
E = Y - X = point estimate of monetary error
|*| = absolute value operator
Since both the E&R and SAP 54 decision rules require the same
sample size (see Roberts [1974]) and are based upon the same sample
estimates (Y and s/vn), decision rule choice can be postponed until
after the sample evidence has been examined. A potential advantage of
postponement is that the auditor can incorporate sample information
about population characteristics (e.g., the accounting error rate and
pattern), which have been shown to affect audit risk.
In the following subsections, we separately consider the ordinary
mean-per-unit (MPU), stratified MPU, and auxiliary estimators.
Separate analyses are required because, ex post to sampling, audit risk
depends jointly upon the decision rule and estimator selected.
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Ordinary MPU Estimator
Although the ordinary MPU estimator has limited applicability in
practice (see Arens and Loebbecke [1981]), the present discussion pro-
vides a foundation for our analysis of other estimators. When
accounting populations are highly skewed (see Stringer [1963]), ordin-
ary MPU estimates based upon an average of the sample account book
values also are likely to exhibit skewness and, thus, violate the
assumption of normality used in constructing hypothesis tests or con-
fidence intervals. In the presence of skewness, ordinary MPU estimates
of the population mean (total) value also have been shown to violate
the independence property of normal distributions by consistently ex-
hibiting high positive correlation with estimates of the standard error
(see Neter and Loebbecke [1975]).
There are important audit risk consequences associated with these
violations of normality. For example, suppose the auditor is examining
an asset account which is fairly presented, but whose subsidiary account
book values are skewed to the right (i.e., the peak of the distribution
is on the left and the tail extends to the right). In this situation,
the distribution of sample MPU mean estimates for asset populations also
would be skewed to the right, so a high proportion of sample estimates
would fall below the actual population value. Ceteris paribus , two-sided
confidence intervals computed under the E&R decision rule would not con-
tain the actual population value as frequently as anticipated under the
assumption of normality (see (1)). Consequently, the risk of efficiency
errors would be higher than the allowable level when the E&R decision
rule is employed in conjunction with the ordinary MPU estimator. A
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similar predisposition toward efficiency errors also exists under the
SAP 54 decision rule, because a small sample mean estimate of the account
value would result in a large point estimate of monetary error (see (2)).
The previous discussion of the effects of skewed mean estimates is
incomplete, however, because correlation between the mean and standard
error estimates also must be considered. Suppose, for example, that
the auditee's asset account book value is fairly stated, but the
auditor's sample estimate of the account mean (total) value is drawn
from the lower region of the sampling distribution and, thus, is less
than the actual mean (total) value of the account. Given positive
correlation between sample estimates of the mean and standard error, a
smaller than average mean estimate typically would be accompanied by a
smaller than average standard error estimate. In this situation, the
computed confidence intervals under the E&R decision rule not only would
be centered below the actual mean, but also will be too narrow. There-
fore, positive correlation reinforces the auditor's predisposition to
commit efficiency errors when the E&R decision rule is adopted in con-
junction with the ordinary MPU estimator.
The positive correlation between estimates of the mean and standard
error can also increase the auditor's vulnerability to effectiveness
errors under the E&R decision rule. For example, suppose that the auditor
is examining an asset population which is misstated by an amount greater
than TE. In this situation, positive correlation between estimates of
the mean account value and standard error would imply that, when the
mean (total) estimate is drawn from the upper tail of the distribution,
estimated standard error also will be larger than average. Since
he computed confidence interval will be wider, the probability of
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including the reported (overstated) book value in the computed con-
fidence interval is increased. Therefore, if the account book value is
misstated, the actual risk of effectiveness errors under the E&R deci-
sion rule would be increased due to positive correlation between esti-
mates of the mean and standard error.
Alternatively, if the auditor were to employ the SAP 54 decision
rule, positive correlation between estimates of the mean account value
and standard error would have different audit risk effects. For example,
suppose that the auditee's account book value is fairly stated, but the
auditor draws a small mean estimate from the lower region of the sampl-
ing distribution. In this situation, positive correlation between
estimates of the mean and standard error implies that both estimates
would be smaller than average. The smaller than average estimate of the
mean value results in a large point estimate of monetary error. However,
the smaller than average standard error estimate has an opposing effect
upon the computed upper precision limit for error (see (2)). Hence, the
auditor's predisposition to commit an efficiency error would be lower
under the SAP 54 decision rule than under the E&R decision rule, since
positive correlation counteracts, rather than reinforces the effect of
positively skewed mean estimates.
The auditor's risk of committing an effectiveness error also is
lower under the SAP 54 decision rule than under the E&R decision rule.
Assuming that the ordinary MPU estimate of the population value is
large (i.e., the point estimate of monetary error is small) and, thus,
close to the overstated account book value, a larger than average esti-
mate of the standard error will increase the computed upper precision
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limit for monetary error. Thus, the auditor's ex post risk of com-
mitting both efficiency and effectiveness errors will be lower under
the SAP 54 decision rule than under the E&R decision rule because posi-
tive correlation mitigates, rather than reinforces, the risk effects
8
of (positively) skewed estimates of the mean.
Stratified MPU Estimator
Auditors have attempted to counteract the effects of population
skewness by stratifying the population before applying the MPU estima-
tor. Empirical evidence presented by Neter and Loebbecke [1975] indi-
cates that stratification, based upon the subsidiary account book
values, makes achieved risk levels closer to planned by reducing the
positive skewness of the mean estimates and the positive correlation
between estimates of the mean and standard error. However, such
stratification also makes the performance of the MPU estimator quite
sensitive to the accounting error pattern.
While empirical evidence regarding actual accounting error patterns
has been limited to asset populations, studies by Ramage, Krieger, and
Spero [1979] and Johnson, Leitch, and Neter [1981] reported that account-
ing error patterns varied widely among auditees and for different asset
accounts such as receivables and inventories. However, several general
features were noted: (1) error-occurrence rates for receivables typi-
cally were lower than for inventories, (2) there were fewer understate-
ment errors in receivables, so accounting error patterns exhibited
greater skewness, and (3) the variability of accounting errors
creased with the size of the underlying subsidiary account.
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Empirical evidence (see Neter and Loebbecke [1975]) indicates
that, in asset accounting populations in which the aggregate monetary
error is small and individual errors are offsetting (i.e., both
understatement and overstatement errors are present), stratified MPU
estimates of the mean account value typically are skewed to the right
and positively correlated with estimates of the standard error.
Accordingly, the audit risk effects, although less severe, are essen-
tially the same as for the ordinary MPU estimator discussed above.
However, in populations in which the aggregate monetary error is large
due to a preponderance of large overstatements, stratified MPU esti-
mates of the population mean (total) value have been shown to exhibit
negative skewness and negative correlation with estimates of the stan-
dard error (see Neter and Loebbecke [1975]).
The presence of negative skewness and correlation has important
risk implications and, therefore, should be considered by the auditor
in choosing between the E&R and SAP 54 decision rules. First, when
the mean estimates are unbiased, but negatively skewed, a high propor-
tion of sample mean estimates will be above the actual account value.
Therefore, under the E&R decision rule, the statistical power to reject
a population with a large overstatement error will be lower, so ceteris
paribus
,
the auditor will be predisposed to commit effectiveness errors.
A similar predisposition also exists under the SAP 54 decision rule,
because a larger than average estimate of the account balance results
in a smaller than average point estimate of monetary error.
Second, negative correlation between stratified MPU estimates
of the mean account value and standard error implies that, when the
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raean estimate is higher than average, the standard error estimate will
be smaller than average. Under the E&R decision rule, such negative
correlation counteracts the predisposition toward effectiveness errors;
on those occasions when the mean estimate is higher than average and,
thus, closer to the overstated account balance, the width of the con-
fidence interval will be narrower than average due to a smaller than
average estimate of the standard error. However, under the SAP 54
decision rule, negative correlation between estimates of the mean and
standard error implies that, when the estimate of the population mean
is higher than average, the point estimate of monetary error and stan-
dard error estimate both will be smaller than average. Since the com-
puted upper precision limit for monetary error in (2) will be further
reduced, the predisposition toward effectiveness errors (due to nega-
tively skewed mean estimates) will be reinforced under the SAP 54 deci-
sion rule and, thus, higher than under the E&R decision rule. This
result, of course, is just the opposite from that which would obtain if
the stratified MPU estimates of the mean account value were positively
correlated with estimates of the standard error (see discussion in pre-
vious subsection)
.
Empirical evidence for the stratified MPU estimator (see Duke,
Neter, and Leitch [1982]) generally confirms the a priori reasoning
presented above. Neither the E&R nor SAP 54 decision rule was found
to be dominant across all asset accounting populations. Among popula-
tions in which the aggregate error was small (i.e., errors were small
and offsetting and the sampling distribution would be expected to be
positively skewed) , the SAP 54 decision rule generally resulted in a
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lower risk of effectiveness errors than did the E&R decision rule.
However, in populations in which the aggregate monetary error was
large due to large overstatement errors (mean estimates would be
expected to exhibit negative skewness and correlation with standard
error estimates), the E&R decision rule provided a lower risk of
effectiveness errors.
Auxiliarv Estimators
The auxiliary estimators (e.g., difference, ratio, and regression)
are even more sensitive to the accounting error pattern than the stra-
tified MPU estimator, because the relationship between the subsidiary
book and audit values is used directly in estimating the population
value. Previous research by Kaplan [1973], Neter and Loebbecke [1975],
Baker and Copeland [1979], Beck [1980], and Duke et al. [1982] indicates
that auxiliary estimates (both stratified and unstratif ied) of the mean
account value are negatively skewed and negatively correlated with
estimates of the standard error when accounting errors are predomi-
nantly overstatements. Furthermore, the auxiliary (squared) standard
error estimates have been found to be biased downward when the varia-
bility of accounting errors increased with the size of the underlying
subsidiary account book value (see Beck [1980]).
Ceteris paribus
,
negative skewness and correlation between esti-
mates of the mean and standard error makes the risk of an effectiveness
error higher under the SAP 54 decision rule than under the E&R decision
rule (see the discussion of the stratified MPU estimator above). Biased
(downward) estimates of the standard error make the computed confidence
intervals tighter, so the probability of rejecting H is further increased
o
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under the E&R decision rule. A similar predisposition toward re-
jecting H also exists under the SAP 54 decision rule since the conr-
o
puted upper precision limit for monetary error would be reduced. But
while the risk of committing an efficiency error would be increased by
incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis under the E&R decision rule,
the probability of an effectiveness error would be increased under the
9
SAP 54 decision rule (see Section 2).
Beck [1980] reported empirical results for the regression estimator
which were basically consistent with the statistical reasoning above.
Among populations with a predominance of overstatement errors, the dis-
tribution of regression mean estimates exhibited negative skewness and
negative correlation with associated estimates of the standard error.
Accordingly, the auditor's exposure to effectiveness risks with the
regression estimator was generally higher under the SAP 54 decision
rule than under the E&R decision rule. Mixed results for the dif-
ference estimator were reported by Duke et al. [1982]. In populations
with overstatement errors, however, their findings were consistent
with Beck's. Accordingly, the limited empirical evidence for the
auxiliary estimators indicates that, when accounting errors are pre-
dominantly overstatements, adoption of the SAP 54 decision rule can
adversely affect the auditor's exposure to effectiveness errors.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the present paper, we have explained how estimation problems can
cause differences in sampling risks under the E&R and SAP 54 decision
rules. We also have identified advantages of postponing decision rule
oice until after the sample evidence has been obtained. Postponement
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imposes no costs upon the auditor, because the same sample size is
required to provide equivalent planned risk, levels under the two deci-
sion rules. Furthermore, the auditor is able to consider possible
risk differences between decision rules when the sample evidence
suggests that underlying statistical assumptions appear to have been
violated.
We also have provided suggestions for the pairing of decision rules
and statistical estimators. For example, we have explained why the
risks of both effectiveness and efficiency errors are likely to be
lower when the SAP 54 decision rule is paired with the ordinary MPU
estimator. However, for other estimators such as the stratified MPU
and auxiliary estimators, neither decision rule appears to be dominant
across all types of asset accounting populations. Decision rule
selection for these estimators should be based upon the charac-
teristics of the population indicated by the sample. In particular,
the auditor should consider the accounting error pattern; if the
accounting errors observed in the sample are relatively small and
include both overstatements and understatements (as has been found in
inventory populations) , then the SAP 54 decision rule would appear to
be preferable. Alternatively, if the sample errors are predominantly
large overstatements (as in accounts receivable) , the E&R decision
rule appears to be preferable.
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Footnotes
1. By convention, statistical decision rules are specified before
sampling to control the risks of incorrectly accepting and incor-
rectly rejecting the null hypothesis at predetermined (allowable)
levels. When there are differences between preliminary and sample
estimates of the standard error, however, the actual risk of in-
correctly accepting the null hypothesis would be altered. Under the
E&R decision rule, the null hypothesis is that the account book
value is fairly stated (see discussion below) so differences between
preliminary and sample estimates would change the auditor's risk of
incorrectly accepting the auditee's account book value (see Roberts
[1978]). Ex post to sampling, auditors can compensate by: 1)
increasing the original sample size or modifying the standard
normal deviate (z-value) used in testing the null hypothesis (or
constructing confidence intervals). The latter modification would
maintain the predetermined risk of incorrectly accepting the null
hypothesis (account book value) by allowing the risk of incorrect
rejection to vary and, thus, make the E&R decision rule formally
equivalent to the SAP 54 decision rule (see Teitlebaura and Robinson
[1975] and Roberts [1978, p. 251]).
2. We focus on classical variables estimators which are applicable to
populations having expected error occurrence rates which are too
high to make use of combined attribute-variables dollar-unit
sampling (CAV-DUS) feasible (see Leslie, Teitlebaum and Anderson
[1979]). Unlike CAV-DUS estimators, classical variable estimators
have been widely used in conjunction with both the E&R and SAP 54
decision rules. Furthermore, the ex post risk differences between
decision rules (discussed below) are due to violations of the
normality assumption which is not required by most CAV-DUS methods.
3. Postponing the choice of decision rules provides two advantages.
First, probable differences in comparative risk exposure due to
violations of statistical assumptions, as indicated by the sample
evidence (e.g., error pattern), can be considered in making the
selection. Second, the task of modifying the E&R decision rule is
avoided (see footnote 1 and discussion below).
4. The null hypothesis that E = (rather than E J^_TE) has been
adopted in the professional literature, since alpha risk is typi-
cally measured at the point, E = 0.
5. There also is a possibility that errors could be introduced in the
accounts if the auditor were to persuade the auditee to make an
adjustment to a fairly presented book value. However, this is
unlikely to occur, because such an error would be identified by
extending the audit tests and, therefore, corrected (see E&R
[1972]).
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6. For example, the introduction and glossary to the Audit and Accounting
Guide: Audit Sampling (AGAS) (AICPA [1983]) adopt the E&R decision
rule by equivalencing the risk of incorrect acceptance of the
financial statements with beta risk (Type II error) and the risk of
incorrect rejection with alpha risk (Type I error). However, the
examples illustrating the calculation of upper precision limits in
attribute sampling and dollar-unit-sampling (implicitly) adopt the
negative formulation.
7. This reasoning, however, suggests that lower (one-sided) confidence
intervals would contain a higher proportion of population values
than planned. Empirical evidence :onfirms this expectation (see Neter
and Loebbecke [1975]).
8. The same risk consequences also would be obtained if the auditor
initially adopted the E&R decision rule, but modified the standard
normal deviate ex post to sampling (see footnote 1). For example,
suppose that Y and s are both larger than their respective means
and, s also is greater than the preliminary estimate. In this
situation, the auditor would reduce za /2 so that the computed
width of the confidence interval would be equal to the planned
width. This modification, of course, reduces the probability that
the confidence interval would erroneously include an account book
value overstated by an intolerable amount and, thereby, decreases
the risk of committing effectiveness errors under the E&R decision
rule.
9. The same risk consequences also would obtain for the modified E&R
decision rule. In the present context, the negatively biased
estimates of the standard error would presumably result in the
auditor's increasing za/2 to make the actual width of the con-
fidence interval equal to the planned width. However, the
auditor's statistical power to reject the null hypothesis actually
would be lower than implied by the biased standard error estimate.
Hence, the auditor's ex post risk of committing effectiveness
errors would be higher than planned.
10. The auditor also may wish to consider changing to a fall-back esti-
mator (see Neter and Loebbecke [1975] and Roberts [1978]) or even
applying alternative audit procedures as discussed in AGAS (AICPA
[1983]). Qualitative as well as quantitative characteristics of
the sample evidence should be considered in making these decisions.
-18-
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